Case Summaries

[09/02] Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc.
In a suit for common law trade dress of a French-press coffee maker known as the Chambord, district court's judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed as, Article 4 of the parties' contract is clear and precise as it allows defendant to sell the coffee maker design anywhere except France - provided that it does not use the Chambord or Melior names and does not use plaintiff's supply channels for four years.

[09/01] Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.
In a patent infringement suit related to a drug for postmenopausal osteoporosis, judgment of the district court is affirmed where: 1) the record amply supports the district court's conclusion that the ordinary artisan would not have considered it obvious to use raloxifene to treat postmenopausal osteoporosis; 2) because the district court's conclusion that the Bone Loss Patents would not have been obvious, its conclusion as to the Low Dose Patent is affirmed as well; 3) district court did not err in concluding that the Bone Loss Patents and the Low Dose Patents were not invalid for lack of enablement; 4) the district court did not clearly err in invalidating the asserted claims of the Particle Size Patents for lack of written description.

[09/01] Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elec. Corp.
In a patent infringement suit pertaining to various electrical and mechanical components of video cassette players and recorders (VCRs), judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded where: 1) district court's judgment of infringement of three patents and the damages for the infringement are affirmed; and 2) district court's determination of no successor liability in applying the South Korean law is reversed and remanded.

[08/31] Stauffer v. Brooks Bros. Inc.
In plaintiff's qui tam action against Brooks Brothers under 35 U.S.C. section 292, claiming that defendants falsely marked its bow ties, district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim for lack of standing and denial of government's motion to intervene is reversed where: 1) plaintiff had standing as he has sufficient alleged (i) an injury in fact to the United States that (ii) is caused by Brooks Brothers' alleged conduct, attaching the markings to its bow ties, and (iii) is likely to be redressed, with a statutory fine, by a favorable decision; and 2) the district court made an error of law in denying the government's motion to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).

[08/30] Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n
In plaintiff's patent infringement suit related to two types of digital storage devices, recordable discs (CD-Rs) and rewritable compact discs (CD-RWs), claiming that defendant was violating section 337(a)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing CD-Rs and CD-RWs that infringed its patents, the International Trade Commission's decision that the doctrine of patent misuse does not bar intervenor-U.S. Philips Corporation from enforcing its patent rights against defendant is affirmed as, even if Phillips and Sony engaged in an agreement not to license the patent at issue for non-Orange-Book purposes, that hypothesized agreement had no bearing on the physical or temporal scope of the patents in suit, nor did it have anti-competitive effects in the relevant market. Therefore, the asserted agreement between Phillips and Sony did not constitute misuse and cannot justify rendering all of Phillips' Orange Book patents unenforceable.

[08/30] Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Fin. Corp.
In plaintiff's suit against E*Trade Financial Corporation (E*Trade) for misappropriation of trade secrets under the California Uniform Trade Secret Act, trial court's denial of plaintiff's request for award of reasonable royalties is reversed and remanded where: 1) given the jury's finding that E*Trade did not profit from its misappropriation of trade secrets, unjust enrichment is not "provable" within the meaning of section 3426.3; 2) since E*Trade had consistently and successfully taken the position that plaintiff's actual losses are not provable, E*Trade is estopped from arguing otherwise now; and 3) because neither actual loss nor unjust enrichment is provable, the trial court had discretion pursuant to section 3426.3(b) to order payment of a reasonable royalty.

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